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Exigent Circumstances: Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act and Federal Emergency Lending 
Programs 
TODD H. EVESON*                                                                                       
I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes Federal 
Reserve Banks, in “unusual and exigent circumstances” and upon the 
affirmative vote of at least five members of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors, to discount notes, drafts, and bills of exchange for participants 
in liquidity facilities or other credit programs.1  This article will present 
a brief history of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and examine 
selected instances during which its powers have been invoked.  It will 
also compare and contrast two of the most significant emergency funding 
programs of the modern era: the TARP Capital Purchase Program of 2008 
(“TARP CPP”)2 and the Paycheck Protection Program of 2020 (“PPP”).3  
Neither TARP CPP nor PPP was implemented under Section 13(3) 
authority (nor, for various reasons, could they have been).  Both programs 
were, however, launched in close coordination with Section 13(3) 
facilities established by the Federal Reserve that were designed to support 
and complement them as part of an integrated emergency response 
solution.   
II.  HISTORY OF SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
The Federal Reserve Act4 created the nation’s first true central 
bank,5 established the member bank system, and, along with the National 
 
* Todd H. Eveson is a partner at Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP.  
1. See 12 U.S.C. §343(3) (2018).  
2. The Capital Purchase Program was an element of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) and promulgated under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008.  12 U.S.C. §5201, et seq.  
3. The Paycheck Protection Program was promulgated under the authority of Title I of the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act of 2020.  Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 
281, 286–94 (2020) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
4. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). 
5. More precisely, it created a decentralized central bank consisting of 12 member banks.  
See History of the Federal Reserve, FED. RES. EDUC., 
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Bank Act of 18646 and the Bank Act of 1933,7 has served as the 
foundation for much of the federal regulation of banking and financial 
services in the United States.8  The original goal of the Federal Reserve 
Act was “to make certain that there will always be an available supply of 
money and credit in the country with which to meet unusual banking 
requirements.”9 It set out to accomplish this goal by providing a new, 
more efficient, and centralized source of liquidity for banks.10  More 




6. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38);  see also LISSA L. 
BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 22–
23 (4th ed. 2011); JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION 10–11 (2d ed. 1997). 
7. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 STAT. 162 (1933); see also BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, 
at 38, 42–44; MACEY & MILLER, supra note 6, at 21–24.  More commonly referred to as the 
Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Banking Act of 1933 created 
the “firewall” between commercial banking and investment banking that was eventually 
removed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, and it also established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  The conversation on federal deposit insurance had been a long- 
running one, spanning almost 50 years and approximately 150 different proposals over the 
years.  See MATTHEW P. FINK, THE UNLIKELY REFORMER: CARTER GLASS AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 105–106 (2019).   
Not to be confused with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, it was the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1932 that amended the Federal Reserve Act by adding Section 10B, “giving the Federal 
Reserve Board temporary emergency authority to allow advances to member banks secured 
by satisfactory collateral at a penalty rate of interest in cases where the borrowing bank had 
exhausted its eligible assets.”  See Parinitha Sastry, The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. POL’Y REV., Sept. 2018, at 1;  Arthur Long, 
Revised Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, ABA BUS. L. TODAY 1 (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/03/revised-section-133-federal-reserve-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/N55A-QHX6].  The Federal Reserve was authorized to exercise authority 
under Section 10B only in “exceptional and exigent circumstances.”  See Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1932, Pub. L. No 72-44, § 2, 47 Stat. 56 (adding section 10B to the Federal Reserve Act).  
In that respect, it was an emergency power that could only be invoked during “exigent 
circumstances” and therefore similar to the soon-to-follow Section 13(3).  Section 13(3), 
however, was to be even more broad in terms of the emergency powers it would vest in the 
Federal Reserve, because it would not be limited to member banks and would, instead, include 
essentially any entity in the private sector.  See infra notes 33–40 and accompanying text. 
8. See Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age, 15 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 83, 84 (2011); William C. Handorf et al, An Examination of the Factors 
Influencing the Enactment of Banking Legislation and Regulation: Evidence from Fifty Years 
of Banking Laws and Twenty-Five Years of Regulation, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 93 (2020). 
9. See O. M. W. Sprague, The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 28 Q. J. ECON. 213, 213 (1914); 
Ben S. Bernanke, A Century of US Central Banking:  Goals, Frame, Accountability, 27 J. 
ECON. PERSP., Fall 2013, at 3, 4 stating that the new Federal Reserve was intended to provide 
an “elastic” currency “by providing liquidity as needed to individual member banks through 
the discount window,” but it was not necessarily envisioned as a “lender of last resort”) . 
10. See id.  
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likes of J.P. Morgan, as had occurred during the 1907 panic.11  In order 
to create a central bank that could provide for a liquidity buffer and a 
more elastic national currency, the principal architect of the Federal 
Reserve Act, Representative Carter Glass,12 conceived of a 
“decentralized system of regional reserve banks under the supervision of 
the Comptroller of the Currency.”13  President Woodrow Wilson favored 
a different governance structure, with oversight by an independent board 
rather than the Comptroller, and urged the establishment of an “altruistic 
Federal Reserve Board at Washington to supervise the proposed 
system.”14  Though Glass continued to advocate for the inclusion of three 
private sector bankers on a nine-member Federal Reserve Board,15 he 
eventually came around to President Wilson’s preference for a seven-
member board composed entirely of public sector appointees.16     
 
11. See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 128 (1990).  During the panic of 1907, 
Morgan “functioned as America’s central bank.  Within two weeks’ time, he saved several 
trust companies and a leading brokerage house, bailed out New York City, and rescued the 
Stock Exchange.”  Id at 122.  Morgan had saved the day, but one lesson drawn from the panic 
was that depending on “rescues by corpulent old tycoons” was a less than ideal approach.  Id. 
at 128.  In addition to Morgan acting as a walking central bank, another interesting aspect of 
the 1907 panic was that it illustrated the extent to which the financial system, even in 1907, 
was already very interconnected.  The panic spread from trust companies and brokerage 
houses, which were more highly leveraged and not as tightly regulated as commercial banks, 
across Wall Street, and through the entire domestic financial system.  See ROGER 
LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA’S BANK: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE 62 
(2015). 
12. Glass was a Representative, and later Senator, from the Commonwealth of Virginia 
who served on the House Committee on Banking and Currency.  FINK, supra note 7, at 14.  
In February of 1912, he was appointed to chair a subcommittee tasked with drafting legislation 
to create a reserve bank.  Id. at 27.  He was the principal architect of what would eventually 
become the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Id. at 30–46; see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, 
at 128. 
13. FINK, supra note 7, at 27.  See also Sprague, supra note 9, at 220.  Glass’s model used 
a decentralized network of reserve banks because he believed such a system “could better be 
expected to minister to the immediate financial and commercial requirements of their 
respective territories.”  FINK, supra note 7, at 30; see also CARTER GLASS, AN ADVENTURE IN 
CONSTRUCTIVE FINANCE 68 (1927).  It is very possible that Glass’s preference for a 
decentralized central bank was influenced by his political leanings as a Virginia Democrat 
and son of a Civil War veteran who was an officer in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army 
of Northern Virginia.       
14. FINK, supra note 7, at 35; see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 182 (stating that 
President Wilson also referred to this centralized oversight body as a “capstone”).  
15. J.P. Morgan also favored private sector representation on the Federal Reserve Board, 
though in his vision of a central bank, the entire bank would be a private sector enterprise 
modeled on the Bank of England.  See CHERNOW, supra note 11, at 129.  This view was not 
universally held on Wall Street, however. The investment banker Paul Warburg stated that in 
his view, “it would be better not to open the door for the criticism that private interest might 
enjoy undue favoritism with the central bank.”  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 122. 
16. See FINK, supra note 7, at 40–41. 
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The proposed Federal Reserve Act encountered strong opposition 
from many private sector bankers, both sides of the aisle in Congress, and 
the press.17  The Democrat-controlled House passed the bill in September 
of 1913.  In the Senate, however, it encountered bi-partisan opposition, a 
competing bill, and even eight weeks of public hearings on banking and 
currency.18  Eventually, with strong support from President Wilson, 
Glass, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, and others, the Federal 
Reserve Act was signed into law on December 23, 1913.19 
A.         The Federal Reserve Act as Originally Conceived 
In addition to serving as a central bank,20 the Federal Reserve was 
originally conceived as a true “bankers bank.”  In other words, its 
outstanding shares were owned by other banks and it could lend only to 
other banks.  More precisely, it could extend credit only to member banks 
through the discount window.21  Under the original Federal Reserve Act, 
direct lending to non-bank enterprises in the private sector was not within 
the scope of the Federal Reserve’s authority.  In fact, there was no 
authority for advances of any kind,22 not even to member banks.  The 
 
17. Id. at 42–46; see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 214 (describing criticism of the 
proposed Federal Reserve Act bill by newspapers of the time). 
18. See FINK, supra note 7, at 47–50; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 231. 
19. Sprague, supra note 9, at 213. 
20. Or, more precisely, a network of central banks, the Federal Reserve Banks.  Id.  
Observers of the time termed this network of Reserve Banks a “most striking divergence from 
European example” and a “really novel plan of a system of regional banks in place of a single 
central bank.”  Id.  This was not the most remarkable provision in the original Federal Reserve 
Act, however.  The statute also included a provision that required national banks to purchase 
stock in their regional reserve bank and required them to deposit their reserve funds there.  
See FINK, supra note 7, at 34. The new law even went so far as to provide for automatic charter 
forfeiture for any national bank that did not opt into the new Federal Reserve system.  See 
Sprague, supra note 9, at 221. 
21. This process is little changed today.  Member banks can apply for access to the discount 
window as an additional source of liquidity, pledging eligible collateral against borrowings.  
This provides a reliable source of funding to go along with deposits, correspondent bank credit 
facilities, Federal Home Loan Bank advances and capital instruments. See Discount Window 
Lending, FED. RES. BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JYX3-WPYP]. 
22. Today, Federal Reserve Banks are authorized to make loans (i.e., to advance funds to 
borrowers through the discount window or otherwise).  
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Federal Reserve was only authorized to discount23 eligible collateral from 
member banks, and the universe of eligible collateral was limited.24   
B.         Expansion of Lending Powers  
All of this began to change in late 1929 and into the early 1930s, 
and, as is so often the case, a crisis provided the impetus for change.  In 
1929, the crisis at hand was the Great Depression.25  The stock market 
crashed in October of 1929, and the panic and bank runs that began in 
193026 only worsened in 1931.  Over 500 banks suspended operations in 
October of 1931 alone,27 and by the following year, a quarter of all banks 
in the nation had failed.28  President Herbert Hoover advocated for a 
broadening of the Federal Reserve’s lending powers to help meet the 
liquidity crisis.29  He was not alone.  Prevailing public opinion of the time 
supported greater involvement by the Federal Reserve in combating the 
crisis and stepping in as a “nationwide lender of last resort.”30  Once 
 
23. As distinct from an advance, which involves subsequent payments of principal and 
interest, discounting eligible collateral such as a note, involves purchasing it at a discount to 
its eventual full value at maturity in a transaction that is intended to be self-liquidating (with 
recourse against the seller in the event the maker of the note defaults). 
24. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13(2), 38 Stat. 251 (1913); HOWARD H. 
HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 27–42 (1973).  
Eligible collateral consisted of so-called “real bills” and certain types of obligations issued by 
the United States Treasury.  See Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 
FED. RES. BANK CLEV., July 1, 1993, at 18.  “Real bills” are notes, drafts and bills of exchange 
arising out of bona fide commercial transactions and having remaining maturities of 90 days 
or less.  Id.; see also Sastry, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining that “real bills” can be broadly 
defined as “short-term, ‘self-liquidating’ instruments used to finance a step in the process of 
converting raw materials to final sales”). 
25. See Long, supra note 7.  
26. The largest bank failure in the nation’s over 160-year history occurred in December of 
1930, when the Bank of the United States was closed by the New York Superintendent of 
Banks.  See Christopher Gray, Streetscapes: The Bank of the United States in the Bronx; The 
First Domino in the Depression, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 1991), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/realestate/streetscapes-bank-united-states-bronx-first-
domino-depression.html [https://perma.cc/P3Q7-7HRJ]; see also Anthony Patrick O’Brien & 
Paul B. Trescott, The Failure of the Bank of United States, 1930, 24 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 384–99 (1992). 
27. See Sastry, supra note 7, at 14. 
28. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 38.   
29. President Herbert Hoover, Statement on Financial and Economic Problems (Oct. 4, 
1931), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-financial-and-economic-
problems [https://perma.cc/PZU8-G2LW]; see also Sastry, supra note 7, at 14; Todd, supra 
note 24, at 17.  
30. See Federal Reserve History – The Banking Acts of 1932, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_acts_of_1932 
[https://perma.cc/FLG4-9DG6]; see also, Todd supra note 24, at 17. 
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again, Carter Glass, now a United States Senator, would take a central 
role in crafting the legislative response.31  During 1932, Glass worked to 
implement a whole series of banking bills, including the law that would 
come to be known as the Glass-Steagall Act.32 
An amendment to Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act that was 
tucked into a highway appropriations bill was among the banking 
legislation enacted in 1932.33  Almost twenty years after the Federal 
Reserve Act was originally enacted, the Emergency Relief and 
Construction Act of 193234 significantly expanded the scope of the 
Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers by adding Section 13(3) to 
the Federal Reserve Act.35  With the addition of these new powers, which 
became effective on July 21, 1932, the Federal Reserve had statutory 
authority to discount eligible notes, drafts and bills of exchange not just 
for Reserve Banks, but also for “any individual, partnership or 
corporation.”36  Thus, the universe of eligible borrowers was greatly 
expanded from that permitted under the original Federal Reserve Act, but 
lending was still only by discount and advances were not permitted.  The 
new law provided that this lending authority could only be exercised in 
“unusual and exigent circumstances,”37 upon an affirmative vote of at 
least five of the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board.38  Further, 
the lending Reserve Bank was required to obtain evidence that the 
nondepository institution borrower was unable to obtain credit from other 
banking institutions,39 and the extension of credit was required to be 
secured to the satisfaction of the lending Reserve Bank.40     
 
31. See FINK, supra note 7, at 111–117; see also RIXEY SMITH & NORMAN BEASLEY, 
CARTER GLASS: A BIOGRAPHY 357 (1939). 
32. Id. 
33. See Sastry supra note 7, at 20.   
34. Pub. L. No. 72-2, 47 Stat. 709 (1932). 
35. Id. § 210, 47 Stat. at 715; see also David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph, 
FED. RES. BANK  MINNEAPOLIS (June 1, 2008), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2008/the-history-of-a-powerful-paragraph 
[https://perma.cc/7FXJ-ZTFD];  see also Long, supra note 7; Sastry supra note 7, at 20.   
36. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2018).  While we might reasonably conclude that “partnership” 
would have included limited liability companies, had they existed at the time, the term 
“corporation” did not include trusts or nonmember banks.   
37. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3).  Here, the drafters of Section 13(3) chose a slightly different 
standard from the “exceptional and exigent” standard used in Section 10B of the Federal 
Reserve Act.  We might conclude that exigent circumstances that are “unusual” occur slightly 
more often than those that are “exceptional,” though there is no case law establishing any 
distinction between the two standards.  See infra note 91. 
38. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3); see also Long supra note 7, at 1. 
39. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.4(d)(8) (2020); Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 
80 Fed. Reg. 78959 (Dec. 18, 2015). 
40. See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78959.  
Specifically, the extension of credit was required to be endorsed or otherwise secured to the 
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While many observers and industry participants associate Section 
13(3) with the emergency measures taken during the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, the first Section 13(3) loans were made in the 1930s during the 
period of “unusual and exigent circumstances” brought about by the 
Great Depression.41  In just the first four years following the enactment 
of Section 13(3), Federal Reserve Banks made over 120 loans to private 
sector firms in a variety of non-financial industries, including farming, 
manufacturing, and even a brewery.42  All of these loans were fairly 
small, however, and none exceeded $300,000 in original principal 
amount.43   
In contrast, there was very little Section 13(3) activity between 
1937 and 2008, though the Federal Reserve Board did “activate” Section 
13(3) authority on a handful of isolated occasions without actually 
extending credit.44  The most interesting cases during this period were 
those instances when the Federal Reserve declined to provide credit to 
prospective borrowers, including the City of New York and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.45  Notwithstanding this long period of 
dormancy, Section 13(3) was further amended by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which removed the 
limitation that collateral be of a type already eligible to secure lending 
transactions by Federal Reserve Banks (i.e., rediscounted commercial 
 
satisfaction of the lending reserve bank, with eligible collateral limited to “real bills” and 
certain Treasury obligations “of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount for 
member banks under the provisions of the [Federal Reserve] Act.”  See Todd, supra note 24, 
at 18; see, 12 CFR 201.4(d)(6).  
41. See Fettig, supra note 35, at 1; Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and 
Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and The Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
221, 233 (2010).  
42. See Mehra, supra note 41, at 233; see also David Fettig, Lender of More than Last 
Resort, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Dec. 1, 2002), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2002/lender-of-more-than-last-resort 
[https://perma.cc/2R52-YRCL]. 
43. See Mehra, supra note 41, at 233; Todd, supra note 24, at 18.  $300,000 in the late 
1930s is equivalent to approximately $2.4 million in 2021 dollars.   
44. See Todd, supra note 24, at 18.  
45.  Id. The Federal Reserve declined to extend credit to the City of New York in 1975, 
though the United States Treasury eventually stepped in as a lender of last resort for the City.  
Id.  The Federal Reserve similarly declined to exercise powers under Section 13(3) to make 
loans to Lockheed Corporation (then known as the Lockheed Aircraft Company) in 1971 and 
to the Chrysler Corporation in 1979.  Id.  In 1991, the Federal Reserve “refused to make a $25 
billion loan to the Bank Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, despite 
requests by the Treasury and the Chairman of the Corporation.” Id.;  see also Fettig supra 
note 35 at 1. 
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loans in accordance with the “real bills” doctrine),46 and replaced it with 
a more broad requirement that collateral consist of security satisfactory 
to the lending Reserve Bank or any satisfactory assets (i.e., securities, 
financial instruments or any other collateral deemed satisfactory by the 
applicable Reserve Bank).47  In other words, collateral was no longer 
required to consist of cash or self-liquidating near-cash equivalents.  This 
amendment was prescient, and it allowed Section 13(3) to be a more 
flexible and, therefore, useful tool during the 2008 Financial Crisis.    
C.         Credit and Liquidity Facilities During the 2008 Financial Crisis 
After a lengthy hiatus, the Federal Reserve exercised emergency 
lending authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act again 
during the 2008 Financial Crisis.48  In a period of approximately nine 
months, Section 13(3) saw far more use than it had during the preceding 
seventy years.  Like the battleships U.S.S Iowa, U.S.S. Missouri, U.S.S. 
New Jersey, and U.S.S. Wisconsin, which were commissioned during 
World War II and deactivated in the 1950s, only to be deployed again 
decades later when the Navy again found itself in need of their massive 
firepower during the first Gulf War,49 Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act proved itself to be “a powerful weapon in the U.S. 
government’s arsenal.”50  Section 13(3) had lain more or less dormant for 
decades, but the government needed every weapon at its disposal during 
the financial crisis, and Section 13(3) was reactivated and pressed into 
service.  
The Federal Reserve emergency credit and liquidity facilities 
authorized during the 2008 Financial Crisis are listed in chronological 
order in the table below.     
 
46. See Long, supra note 7; Section 13 – Powers of Federal Reserve Banks, FED. RES. BD., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section13.htm [https://perma.cc/EJ6Q-GZH7];  
Todd, supra note 24, at 19. 
47. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, § 473, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2018)) (amending section 13(c) 
of the Federal Reserve Act); see also HACKLEY, supra note 24, at 109–112; Todd, supra note 
24, at 20.    
48. See Sastry, supra note 7, at 3; see also Christian A. Johnson, From Fire Hose to Garden 
Hose: Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 715 (2020) (describing 
the Federal Reserve’s “injection of extraordinary levels of liquidity into a failing economic 
and financial system” during 2008). 
49. See DAVID MILLER AND CHRIS MILLER, MODERN NAVAL COMBAT 108 (1986); THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SEA POWER 80 (1988); History, BATTLESHIP MO. MEMORIAL, 
https://www.ussmissouri.org/learn-the-history [https://perma.cc/DD2N-6VRZ#] (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2020). 
50. See Long, supra note 7.  
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Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York bridge loan of 
$12.9 billion to Bear Stearns 





$30 billion nonrecourse loan 
to JPMorgan Chase secured 
by Bear Stearns’ assets 
 
JP Morgan Chase 
March 16 





Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York senior loan of 
$29 billion to the Maiden 
Lane LLC vehicle (ML) 
 
Maiden Lane LLC, 
Bear Stearns 
September 16 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York revolving credit 
facility of up to $85 billion 






Paper Money Market 




U.S. bank holding 
companies (parent 
companies or U.S. 
 
51. See Sastry, supra note 7, at 3 (table reproduced with the author’s permission).  
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Announcement 
Date 






affiliates) and U.S. 
branches and 




Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York loan to London-
based broker-dealer 
subsidiaries of Goldman 







and Merrill Lynch 
October 7 






Arrangement allowing the 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to borrow up to 
$37.8 billion in securities 





subsidiaries of AIG 
October 21 
Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF) 
 
U.S. money market 
mutual funds 
November 10 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York loan of up to 
$22.5 billion to Maiden 
Lane II LLC in support of 
AIG (MLII) 
 
Maiden Lane II 
LLC, AIG 
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Announcement 
Date 






Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York loan of up to $30 
billion to Maiden Lane III 
LLC in support of AIG 
(MLIII) 
 




commitment to provide a 





Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York loan to London-
based broker-dealer 






Term Asset Backed 
Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) 




The facilities established by the Federal Reserve during 2008 can 
be divided into two general categories:  (1) broad-based programs 
available to an entire class of participants, and (2) “one-shot” facilities 
specially tailored for and made available to a single borrower.52  It is also 
worth noting that some of the borrower entities in the latter group were 
actually special purpose vehicles organized by the Federal Reserve 
specifically for use in connection with an extension of credit under 
 
52. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 10 
(2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44185.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL8J-E4RZ]. 
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Section 13(3).53  For example, the Maiden Lane facilities54 involved 
special purpose vehicles organized in connection with credit facilities 
designed for Bear Stearns and AIG.55  This innovation, wherein the 
government created the Section 13(3) borrower, allowed Section 13(3) to 
be used in an entirely novel way.56  It was an elegant approach, and also 
a highly effective one.  The first Maiden Lane facility, which was 
authorized in connection with the acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co., ultimately returned a $2.5 billion profit for 
taxpayers.57  More importantly, the Federal Reserve’s use of Section 
13(3) during the 2008 Financial Crisis helped successfully restore 
financial stability.58   
D.         Amendment of Section 13(3) by the Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) was enacted in reaction—or, depending on 
one’s perspective, overreaction—to the events of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis.59  Effective July 21, 2010, Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
modified the Federal Reserve’s authority to provide emergency facilities 
 
53. While it is the case that the law surrounding entities such as limited liability companies 
and statutory trusts did not develop until decades after Section 13(3)’s advent, the Federal 
Reserve’s role in engineering this new approach for Section 13(3) transactions still must not 
be overlooked, nor should the fact that Congress essentially ratified the special purpose 
vehicle counterparty approach for Section 13(3) transactions when Dodd-Frank was enacted.  
The author gratefully acknowledges insights and perspective shared by Thomas C. Baxter, 
Jr., former General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  E-mail from Thomas 
C. Baxter, to author (Jan. 26, 2021, 1:03 PM EST) (on file with author).  Mr. Baxter’s views 
are his own and do not reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors or any Federal 
Reserve Bank.    
54. The Maiden Lane limited liability companies were named for one of the streets that 
borders the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s block in lower Manhattan. 
55. See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 116, 393 (2010). 
56. If the special purpose vehicle approach increased Section 13(3)’s flexibility (or, rather, 
allowed existing flexibility to be more fully realized), it arguably also allowed for better 
compartmentalization and enhanced transparency in connection with Section 13(3) 
transactions.  See Email from Thomas C. Baxter, supra note 53.   
57. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane [https://perma.cc/ND5G-KWPY];  
Michael S. Derby, New York Fed Says It Wound Down Crisis Bailout Facility With $2.5 
Billion Profit, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-fed-
says-it-wound-down-crisis-bailout-facility-with-2-5-billion-profit-1537299809 
[https://perma.cc/QD7L-FEJG]. 
58. See Long, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 48, at 716 (stating that the Federal 
Reserve’s use of Section 13(3) emergency lending authority during the Financial Crisis was 
an unparalleled success). 
59. See Lissa L. Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: Tarp Bailout Backlash and Too Big to Fail, 
15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69 (2011). 
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for nondepository institutions under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act.60   
Several of the amendments to Section 13(3) were designed to 
place new checks and controls on the Federal Reserve’s emergency 
lending powers.  As amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, any Section 13(3) 
emergency lending program or facility must be for the purpose of 
providing liquidity to the financial system, not to aid a failing borrower.61  
Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act provided that no Section 13(3) program 
or facility could be structured to remove assets from the balance sheet of 
a single and specific company, and that no program or facility could be 
established for the purpose of assisting a single and specific company to 
avoid bankruptcy, resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or any 
other federal or state insolvency proceeding.62  Effective January 1, 2016, 
Regulation A of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors was also 
amended to further supplement amended Section 13(3) by providing that 
the prohibition on lending to insolvent firms would include any borrower 
unable to pay undisputed debts as they become due during the ninety days 
prior to borrowing.63  Regulation A also broadened the Section 13(3) 
definition of “insolvency” to include any borrower deemed by the Federal 
Reserve Board or lending Reserve Bank to be insolvent.64  Certifications 
by the borrower’s chief executive officer (or other authorized officer) that 
the borrower is not insolvent were also instituted.65  
The Dodd-Frank Act also required that all Section 13(3) 
programs and facilities allow for broad-based eligibility.66  The Federal 
Reserve press release announcing the amendment of Regulation A of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors clarifies that “broad-based 
eligibility” refers to a program or facility in which at least five entities 
would be eligible to participate and which is “not designed for the 
purpose of aiding any number of failing firms.”67 
 
60. Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. 78959 (Dec. 18, 2015). 
61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 
(2018)). 
62. Id.  Here, Congress drew a policy line between the newly established resolution 
authority under Title II of Dodd-Frank and Section 13(3) emergency lending authority, and 
Section 13(3) was amended to remove an overlap.  See Email from Thomas C. Baxter, supra 
note 53.    
63. See 12 C.F.R § 201.4(d)(5) (2020). 
64. Id. 
65. See 12 C.F.R § 201.4(d)(5)(iv)(A). 
66. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a), 124 Stat. at 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343); see also 12 
C.F.R § 201.4(d)(4).    
67. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule 
Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
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In addition to these new requirements for eligibility and broad 
access, the Dodd-Frank Act also modified the collateral requirements for 
emergency loans again, this time instituting a requirement that collateral 
be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.68  New requirements 
governing the approval, implementation, and duration of Section 13(3) 
facilities were also added.69  Among the new requirements imposed by 
the Dodd-Frank Act was a prohibition on the establishment of any 
Section 13(3) facility without approval of the Secretary of the Treasury 
and new requirements that Section 13(3) programs and facilities be 
reevaluated every six months and terminated in a “timely and orderly 
fashion.”70   
III.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TARP CPP 
It is not unusual for a liquidity crisis to be a material factor 
contributing to the failure of a financial institution.71  Central bankers can 
attempt to manage liquidity levels within the financial system through 
monetary policy and liquidity programs, including Section 13(3) 
facilities.  The various liquidity programs established under Section 13(3) 
authority in 2008 helped keep the interconnected financial system from 
seizing during a systemic liquidity crisis, but the 2008 Financial Crisis 
was not just a liquidity crisis.  It was also an asset quality crisis, a capital 
crisis, and a crisis of confidence.72  During 2008 and for several years 
 
Act (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ND38-HV8L].   
68. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a), 124 Stat. at 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343); see also 12 
C.F.R § 201.4(d)(6). 
69. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a), 124 Stat. at 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343).   
70. Id. 
71. A “bank run” is the classic example of a liquidity crisis.  “During booming economic 
environments it is easy to take for granted the availability of abundant liquidity.  During 
periods of economic downturn, however, liquidity can quickly be elevated to the most 
important CAMELS component, as it is critical to the continued solvency of a distressed 
financial institution. A bank may have good asset quality, strong earnings, and adequate 
capital, but if it is unable to maintain sufficient liquidity, it runs the risk of failure. And the 
speed at which liquidity can evaporate makes effective risk analysis particularly relevant to 
bank regulators.”  See Liquidity Analysis: Decades of Change, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.: 
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin07/article01_liqui
dity.html [https://perma.cc/8M7C-S5DY] (last updated Dec. 7, 2007); John C. Dugan, 
Addressing the Fundamental Banking Policy Problem of Runs, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 11 
(2018).  
72. During the second half of 2008, well established, normally efficient financial markets 
saw their liquidity “evaporate” almost overnight, valuations of financial instruments and 
commercial real estate plummeted, money market funds experienced extreme redemption 
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thereafter, the banking system was stressed to a point that additional 
capital was necessary in order to stabilize, and ultimately save, many 
financial institutions.73  Furthermore, capital simply was not available in 
the regular public or private markets during that time.74  
While Section 13(3) is an extremely powerful and flexible tool 
and “unusual and exigent” circumstances unquestionably existed during 
the 2008 Financial Crisis, Section 13(3) does not authorize direct 
investment in equity securities issued by financial institutions or any 
other private sector firm.75  It simply was not the right tool to augment 
the regulatory capital of financial institutions because that was never what 
Section 13(3) was designed to do.  A different statute was necessary.  The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200876 provided the necessary 
statutory authority77 for the United States Treasury to invest directly in 
equity securities issued by banks and bank holding companies through 
the TARP CPP.78  
 
pressure, bank and bank holding company capital ratios sank to dangerously low levels, and 
overnight borrowing rates and bond yields were highly elevated.  There was panic in the air. 
73. See PAULSON, supra note 55, at 365 (stating “our banking system was massively 
undercapitalized”). 
74. Id. at 345. 
75. Id. at 229 (stating that it was the Federal Reserve’s view that it could make a loan to 
save AIG, whereas it could not extend credit to Lehman Brothers, because with AIG “we were 
dealing with a liquidity, not a capital, problem”). 
76. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). 
77. Id.; see also Lissa L. Broome, Extraordinary Government Intervention to Bolster Bank 
Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 137, 139–40 (2009) (noting that the United States 
Treasury’s statutory authority under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to purchase 
preferred stock in financial institutions was “somewhat convoluted”). 
78. The Capital Purchase Program was designed to enhance regulatory capital and save the 
U.S. banking system, but it was also designed to increase the availability of credit to private 
sector borrowers.  As then Secretary of the Treasury Paulson stated in public remarks on 
October 20, 2008: 
While many banks have suffered significant losses during this period of 
market turmoil, many others have plenty of capital to get through this 
period, but are not positioned to lend as widely as is necessary to support 
our economy. This program is designed to attract broad participation by 
healthy institutions and to do so in a way that attracts private capital to 
them as well. Our purpose is to increase confidence in our banks and 
increase the confidence of our banks, so that they will deploy, not hoard, 
their capital. And we expect them to do so, as increased confidence will 
lead to increased lending. This increased lending will benefit the U.S. 
economy and the American people.  
Paulson Sees “Efficient Process” to Take Bank Stakes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2008), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-REB-2169 [https://perma.cc/ZB6C-A3MD]; see also 
PAULSON, supra note 55, at 372 (describing a press conference by Secretary Paulson). 
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The TARP CPP involved the issuance and sale of non-voting, 
perpetual preferred stock by qualifying financial institutions79 directly to 
the United States Treasury.80  Perpetual preferred stock issued in the 
TARP CPP program had an initial yield of 5%, which stepped up to 9% 
on the fifth anniversary of issuance.81  TARP CPP preferred stock was 
redeemable, at the issuer’s option, on or after the third anniversary of 
issuance.82  In addition, participating issuers were required to issue 
common stock warrants to the United States Treasury; comply with 
restrictions on executive compensation and common stock dividends; and 
fulfill ongoing reporting requirements.83  
In total, the TARP CPP disbursed an aggregate of $204.9 billion 
for investment into 707 financial institutions.84  These investments 
yielded a total profit of over $16 billion for the program.85  By any 
standard, TARP CPP was a success.86  It was a profitable investment for 
American taxpayers and without it, there would have been many more 
bank failures—not to mention the potential for systemic failure of the 
entire U.S. banking system.  Practically speaking, TARP CPP helped to 
preserve a population of banks that would prove to be a crucial national 
resource during the next crisis.   
 
79. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. ET AL., APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR TARP CAPITAL 
PURCHASE PROGRAM (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Documents/application-guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P77T-7SAA] (providing that qualifying institutions were bank holding 
companies, financial holding companies, insured depository institutions and savings and loan 
holding companies that engaged solely or predominately in activities permissible for financial 
holding companies under relevant law, which were established and operating in the United 
States, not controlled by a foreign bank or company, and which were approved by the United 
States Treasury following referral of an application filed with their primary federal regulator). 
80. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM SENIOR PREFERRED 
STOCK AND WARRANTS (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/document5hp1207.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YBX-J3EX]; see also, 
Broome, supra note 77 at 141 (describing the material terms of equity investments under 
TARP CPP).  
81. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 80. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See TARP Investment Program Transaction Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Investment-
Program-Transaction-Reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/2D9B-JEWH] (providing a compilation 
of reports with “transaction level-detail of all TARP programs except housing programs”); 
see also PAULSON, supra note 55, at 382.   
85. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-524, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES: TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 5 (2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676954.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5RT-FDVW]. 
86. See Broome, supra note 59 at 72.   
2021] EMERGENCY LENDING POWERS 119 
IV.  THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND PPP 
The COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting effect on the 
American economy and workforce demanded a new source of small 
business credit that could be deployed very rapidly.  PPP loans were 
designed to get funds into the hands of small businesses to provide for 
the continued payment of wages and to dampen the shock of an 
impending unemployment crisis.  To the casual observer, it may appear 
that TARP CPP and PPP have much in common, but the similarity is only 
skin deep owing to the fact that the two programs were designed to 
respond to entirely different types of emergencies.   
PPP involved government-guaranteed loans with the potential for 
100% loan forgiveness.  TARP CPP, on the other hand, involved equity 
investments, not debt,87 and contemplated eventual redemption at par 
plus accrued but unpaid dividends.  While PPP provided for payment 
deferral, TARP CPP required regular, quarterly dividend payments.  
TARP CPP was available only to qualifying financial institutions subject 
to approval by banking regulators and an investment committee within 
the United States Treasury.88  PPP, on the other hand, was broadly 
available to almost any small business, so long as the business could 
certify that the funds were necessary to support ongoing operations.89  
TARP CPP was the creation of an entirely new statute, while PPP was 
technically an expansion of the existing Small Business Act Section 7(a) 
lending program.  Even the scale and granularity of the two programs 
were in stark contrast.  TARP CPP entailed approximately 700 
transactions involving an aggregate amount of approximately $205 
billion, while PPP involved over 5.2 million transactions and 
 
87. In limited circumstances, usually, institutions that had made elections to be taxed under 
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code and which could therefore have only one class of 
equity issued and outstanding, the Treasury purchased debt securities. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM (SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS) (2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/cap/Documents/scorp-term-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ75-FC3B].  The 
Emergency Capital Investment Program was a program implemented during 2020 for 
minority depository institutions (“MDIs”) and community development financial institutions 
(“CDFIs”), which was very similar to TARP CPP.  See Emergency Capital Investment 
Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/emergency-
capital-investment-program [https://perma.cc/4B5G-R3P2]. 
88. See PAULSON, supra note 55, at 382. 
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approximately $525 billion.90  These differences are indicative of the fact 
that the 2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic had entirely 
different origins, presented fundamentally different sets of problems, and 
required different policy tools.  
One thing PPP and TARP CPP did have in common, however, 
was that neither could have been implemented under authority of the 
Federal Reserve Act.  PPP was an emergency lending program and not a 
capital program, and 2020 was undoubtedly a year characterized by 
“unusual and exigent circumstances.”91  As such, PPP was technically 
closer to being within the scope of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act than was TARP CPP, though PPP loans were unsecured and many 
were probably made to borrowers that would have been deemed to be 
insolvent under Regulation A standards.  The sheer number of PPP 
borrowers would also have presented logistical impediments to launching 
a program like PPP under Section 13(3).  Practically speaking, it would 
have been impossible for the Federal Reserve Banks to review and 
process over 5 million PPP loans in a matter of just a few months.  The 
scale and timing for PPP’s deployment demanded a far larger network of 
lenders to underwrite and administer the extension of business credit.  
Working through the thousands of private sector commercial banks and 
other small business lenders across the nation was the only possibility.92 
The very banking system that had been supported and preserved by 
TARP CPP less than a dozen years before was precisely the national 
resource that was necessary for the rapid implementation of PPP.93  As 
 
90. See PPP Data, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/funding-
programs/loans/coronavirus-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program/ppp-data 
[https://perma.cc/6CSR-US2H] (providing data as of January 31, 2021). 
91. The Federal Reserve’s current framework for monitoring financial stability is central 
to assessments of whether “unusual and exigent circumstances” exist at any given point in 
time.  The financial stability monitoring framework uses data from the Federal Reserve’s 
Division of Research and Statistics, Division of Supervision, Regulation & Credit (including 
data pulled from quarterly reports filed by domestic financial institutions and also real time 
data gathered by the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC)), 
academics and other sources to monitor trends and vulnerabilities affecting American 
households and businesses.  This data generally falls into four broad categories: (i) valuation 
data and analysis of asset prices relative to economic fundamentals or historical norms; (ii) 
borrowing levels of businesses and households; (iii) leverage within the financial sector (i.e., 
an assessment of whether regulatory capital ratios are commensurate with the risk profiles of 
financial institutions); and (iv) funding and liquidity within the financial sector.  See FED. 
RESERVE BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 7–8 (2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B4YH-HC7Q].   
92. See id. at 12 (stating that small community banks accounted for 50% of aggregate PPP 
proceeds advanced and 90% of active PPP borrowers).  
93. It is questionable whether a nation like Canada, with only a couple dozen domestic 
banks, could ever have deployed a program like PPP. 
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Justice Brennan succinctly stated in United States v. Philadelphia 
National Bank, “thus it is that banks are the chief source of the country's 
short-term business credit.”94   
In addition to the challenge of rapid implementation on a massive 
scale, the fact that PPP loans needed to be extended to many borrowers 
with little or no collateral to pledge meant that Section 7(a) of the Small 
Business Act95 was better suited for the job than Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act.  Section 13(3), even as amended by FDICIA, would 
have imposed collateral requirements that few small businesses would 
have been able to meet and certainly not small businesses that were 
required by the terms of PPP to certify that the loan was necessary in 
order to support their ongoing operations. 
If the Small Business Act and the nation’s existing commercial 
banking system provided the necessary infrastructure for processing and 
originating PPP loans and if an SBA-administered forgiveness process 
and government guarantee helped address the problem of underwriting 
them, the problem of actually funding over half a trillion dollars’ worth 
of PPP loans still loomed.  For this challenge, Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act was the perfect tool, and the Federal Reserve was poised to 
provide emergency liquidity by implementing the Paycheck Protection 
Program Lending Facility on April 9, 2020.96  The Paycheck Protection 
Program Lending Facility was designed to provide liquidity to 
participating PPP lenders97 so that the program could operate as intended.  
The facility permitted lenders to pledge SBA guaranteed PPP loans and 
receive low-cost, non-recourse funding equal to 100% of the principal 
amount of the pledged loans for the duration of the pledged loans.98  This 
funding, together with the zero-risk weight assigned to PPP loans for 
regulatory capital purposes,99 allowed PPP to function far more 
efficiently.  While PPP was not itself a Section 13(3) facility, it could 
 
94. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 (1963). 
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2018). 
96. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDERAL RESERVE 13(3) FACILITIES ANNOUNCED DURING 
COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/blog/2020/LSE_2020_COVID-
fed-response_fleming [https://perma.cc/JK5D-3JAR].  The Main Street Lending Program 
Facilities were also rolled out under Section 13(3) authority on April 9, 2020.  Id.  
97. Including nonbank lenders, such that Section 13(3) provided the required statutory 
authority.  




99. See id. 
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never have functioned as it did without Section 13(3) liquidity support 
for participating lenders. 
In addition to the Paycheck Protection Program Lending Facility, 
there were twelve other Section 13(3) facilities established by the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors during 2020.  These programs are listed in 
the table below. 







(CPFF) March 17, 2020 
Enhance the liquidity of the 
commercial paper market by 
providing a liquidity backstop to 
U.S. issuers of commercial paper 
(PDCF) March 17, 2020 
Provide funding to primary dealers 
to support market liquidity and 
functioning and facilitate credit 
availability to businesses and 
households 
(MMLF) March 18, 2020 
Assist money market funds in 
meeting demands for redemptions 
by households and other investors, 
enhancing credit provision to the 
broader economy 
(PMCCF) March 23, 2020 
Support credit to large employers 
so that they are better able to 
maintain business operations and 
capacity 
(SMCCF) March 23, 2020 
Support credit to large employers 
by providing liquidity for 
outstanding corporate bonds 
 
100. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 96. 





(TALF) March 23, 2020 
Enable issuance of asset-backed 
securities backed by student loans, 
auto loans, credit card loans, loans 
guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration, and certain other 
assets to support the flow of credit 
to consumers and businesses 
(MSNLF) & 
(MSELF) 
April 9, 2020 
Enhance support for small and 
mid-sized business through loans 
to companies employing up to 
10,000 workers or with less than 
$2.5 billion in revenues 
(MLF) April 9, 2020 
Purchase short term notes from 
state and local governments to help 
them better manage cash flow 
pressures 
(PPPLF) April 9, 2020 
Supply liquidity to participating 
financial institutions to bolster the 




The speed with which these 2020 Section 13(3) facilities were 
deployed—with nine announced between March 17, 2020 and April 9, 
2020—would seem to allay fears that the Dodd-Frank amendments to 
Section 13(3) might impede the Federal Reserve’s ability to respond 
swiftly in the face of a crisis.  As Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell 
noted in a speech on May 13, 2020, the Federal Reserve acted with 
“unprecedented speed and force.”101   
 
101. Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20200513a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZGT9-UFXG]. 
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A.         Order of Announcement  
The order in which these facilities were announced during 2020 
is noteworthy.  Those facilities that were most critical to restoring and 
maintaining market functioning and systemic liquidity appear to have 
been announced first, followed by facilities designed to support corporate 
credit and issuance of asset-backed securities, which were in turn 
followed by facilities intended to support municipalities and non-profits 
and provide liquidity to PPP lenders and Main Street Lending Program 
lenders.  Facilities announced later in the sequence served purposes that 
were no less important than the first facilities announced in mid-March 
and were still oriented toward maintaining market functioning, but they 
could afford to trail those facilities designed to address vulnerabilities that 
could become systemically dangerous within days, or even hours, as 
opposed to weeks.  Furthermore, the first three Section 13(3) facilities 
announced in 2020 were very similar to facilities announced during 
2008.102  Having an existing 2008 blueprint to work from undoubtedly 
sped up the implementation timeline for these facilities, and it would also 
be fair to assume that experience during the 2008 Financial Crisis 
informed views on those facilities that should be rolled out first.   
B.         “Announcement Effect” 
There is another interesting aspect to the announcements of 
various Section 13(3) facilities during 2020, which is that a facility can 
have the effect of improving market functioning and restoring liquidity, 
even in situations where the facility has not yet been used or ultimately 
sees only limited usage.  Federal Reserve Board Chair Powell referred to 
this as “announcement effect” in his remarks before the House 
Committee on Financial Services on September 22, 2020.103  The 
Municipal Liquidity Facility, announced on April 9, 2020, demonstrates 
 
102. The first three Section 13(3) facilities announced during 2020 were the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), 
and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 91, at 13.   
103. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act: Testimony Before the H. Comm. 
on Financial Services, 116th Cong. 9 (2020) (statement of Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors Chair Jerome H. Powell);  see also Hannah Lang, Cheat Sheet: 8 Ways Fed is 
Using Emergency Powers to Counter Pandemic, AM. BANKER (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/list/cheat-sheet-8-ways-fed-is-using-emergency-powers-
to-counter-pandemic [https://perma.cc/GB7E-FAUB] (“The ultimate demand for these 
facilities is quite difficult to predict because there is this announcement effect that it really 
gets the market functioning again.”). 
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the phenomenon.  Prior to its announcement, the market for municipal 
securities was experiencing unusual illiquidity and pricing pressure as a 
result of the pandemic, with aggregate issuances during the second half 
of March running at a fraction of normal volume.104  Only two issues of 
municipal securities were actually purchased by the Municipal Liquidity 
Facility during its first six months of operation,105 but during that period, 
market liquidity and volume were restored with over $250 billion in new 
municipal bonds issued to private sector investors.106  Further, the 
improvement in market liquidity was almost immediate, despite the fact 
that the first purchase actually executed by the facility did not occur until 
two months after the facility was announced.107  This demonstrates the 
extent to which the announcement and continued existence of a Section 
13(3) facility backstop can have profound effects on financial stability 
and market functioning that go well beyond its direct market activity.108  
“Announcement effect” is a phenomenon, of course, only because of the 
Federal Reserve’s track record of speed, skill and success in 
implementing Section 13(3) facilities.     
C.         Facility Leverage and Reserve Bank Operation  
Two additional items of note with respect to the Section 13(3) 
facilities announced during 2020 are the equity component of each 
 
104. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 91, at 11;  see also Marco Cipriani et al., Municipal 
Debt Markets and the COVID-19 Pandemic, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.: LIBERTY STREET 
ECONOMICS (June 29, 2020), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/06/municipal-debt-markets-and-the-
covid-19-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/3U93-55UF] (stating that during March of 2020, 
the market for municipal securities was “severely stressed” and issuance of municipal 
securities “dried up”). 
105. During 2020, the State of Illinois issued and sold bonds having an aggregate face 
amount of $3.2 billion to the Municipal Liquidity Facility and the New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority issued and sold $3.348 billion.  See Municipal Liquidity Facility, 
FED. RES. BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/muni.htm 
[https://perma.cc/N3WH-DC8H] (providing a compilation of MLF transaction-specific 
disclosures).  
106. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 91, at 13.   
107. See Cipriani et al., supra note 104. 
108. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act: Testimony Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 116th Cong. 9 (2020) (statement of Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors Chair Jerome H. Powell) (stating that even municipal issuers without direct access 
to the Municipal Liquidity Facility have still benefited from a more efficient municipal 
securities market); see also Cipriani et al., supra note 104 (stating that conditions in municipal 
markets improved in part due to not just the implementation of the Municipal Liquidity 
Facility but also to its announcement). 
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facility and the particular Reserve Bank acting as lender for each.  Many 
of the 2020 facilities included an equity commitment from the United 
States Treasury comprising 10% of the total facility.  This leverage ratio 
is not mandated by Section 13(3) or the Dodd-Frank Act, and is instead 
ultimately a function of the risk assessments for various asset classes and 
the requirement that extensions of credit be “secured to the satisfaction” 
of the Reserve Bank lender.  For example, the Municipal Liquidity 
Facility had a higher leverage ratio with Treasury contributing $35 billion 
towards the aggregate maximum facility of $500 billion, whereas the 
Main Street Lending Program Facility had a lower leverage ratio with 
Treasury contributing $75 billion towards an aggregate maximum facility 
of $600 billion. Turning to the Reserve Banks, it has been interesting to 
note which Reserve Banks operate particular Section 13(3) facilities.  The 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York has served as lender with many of 
the 2020 facilities, owing to its prior experience with Section 13(3) 
facilities during the 2008 Financial Crisis, its direct relationships with 
primary dealers, and the fact that it is Treasury’s fiscal agent and holder 
of Treasury’s general account.  The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has 
served as lender for the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
owing to its expertise with money market funds, and all twelve Reserve 
Banks are serving as Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility 
lenders to provide liquidity to downstream lenders extending PPP small 
business loans in their respective districts.109 
D.         Proposed Amendment of Section 13(3) 
In the course of Congressional debate of various stimulus bills, 
and specifically, the bill passed by Congress and signed into law during 
the last week of 2020, there was a proposal in the United States Senate to 
amend the Federal Reserve’s lending authority under Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act.110  While there was some partisan disagreement as 
 
109. See FED. RESERVE BD., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING 
FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
(2020) (available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-
pmccf-smccf-talf-mlf-ppplf-msnlf-mself-msplf-nonlf-noelf-12-11-20.pdf) 
[https://perma.cc/D6ZB-K8E7].  Various of the Reserve Banks have developed expertise in 
certain markets and sectors.  For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has developed 
expertise in housing and real estate finance, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has 
particular expertise with central counterparties, and the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco has depth with matters pertaining to community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs) and fintech.   
110. See Rachel Siegel, Debate over Fed’s Powers Prove Stumbling Block to Stimulus 
Talks, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020), 
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to whether the proposal would abridge the Federal Reserve’s emergency 
lending powers or simply affect Section 13(3) facilities that had been 
implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic,111 Section 13(3) was 
ultimately left untouched.112    
V.  CONCLUSION 
The enactment of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and 
its subsequent expansion have given the Federal Reserve a powerful tool 
to support systemic liquidity and restore market functioning during times 
of stress.  The Federal Reserve has, in turn, used this power judiciously.  
While the Dodd-Frank Act altered to some degree the manner in which 
Section 13(3) facilities were permitted to be designed and implemented, 
the Dodd-Frank amendments appear not to have adversely affected the 
speed with which Section 13(3) powers may be brought to bear during a 
crisis.  A proposal to modify and cut back the Federal Reserve’s 
longstanding emergency lending powers under Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act was debated and, thankfully, abandoned during late 
2020.  
Interestingly, two of the most notable federal emergency funding 
programs of the current era were not Section 13(3) facilities.  
Specifically, Section 13(3) was not the right tool to augment rapidly 
eroding bank and bank holding capital during the height of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, nor was the Federal Reserve equipped to rapidly deploy 
an emergency lending program on a scale sufficient to extend credit to 
over 5.2 million small business borrowers in a matter of just a few 
months, much less to borrowers that may not have met the solvency or 
collateral requirements for participation in a Section 13(3) facility.  As a 
result, TARP CPP and PPP were not implemented under Section 13(3), 
though both programs were launched in close coordination with 
complementary Section 13(3) facilities as part of an integrated 
response.113 
While there has been debate over moral hazard and whether the 
U.S. financial system should have been “bailed out” with the TARP 
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111. See id. 
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113. See PAULSON, supra note 55, at 364 (stating that then President of the Federal Reserve 
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CPP,114 had the financial system not been recapitalized and supported, 
the private sector infrastructure to deploy PPP might not have been in 
place when it was most needed.  If ever there was evidence that a strong 
banking industry, including a broad-based community bank segment, is 
a crucial national resource, then the COVID-19 pandemic has provided 
the answer.  Similarly, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act is also 
an important national resource, though it is one that we all hope is not 
needed again anytime soon.   
 
 
114. See Broome, supra note 59. 
